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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
occur after the term of governor has been commenced. The decision
in State v. Whitman, 10 Cal. 38 upholds this viewpoint.
The Supreme Court's decision was not based entirely on the exact
wording of the constitution and of the statutes. "It is extremely im-
portant in the interpretation of constitutional provisions," the court
says, "that we avoid determinations based purely on technical or verbal
argument and that we seek to discover the true spirit and intent of the
provisions examined." Thus, where a constitutional clause presents
reasonable ground for difference it must be interpreted in a sense which
will bring out the meaning intended by those who adopted the clause.
This case is especially interesting not only because its decision is
vital to so many people but also because, being without precedent, its
decision is based chiefly upon interpretation rather than citation and
upon argumentation rather than quotation-a situation rarely encoun-
tered at the present time.
JOAN MOONAN.
Tort Liability - Charitable Corporations. -Plaintiff brought an
action against the Young Mens' Christian Association of Chicago for
injuries sustained while the plaintiff was a guest in the defendant's
hotel, alleging the negligent operation of an elevator in which he was
a passenger. In the trial court the defendant moved to strike the com-
plaint, which motion was granted. The decision of both the Superior
Court of Cook County and of the Illinois Supreme Court was based
upon the fact that the defendant was a charitable corporation and as
such was not liable for personal injuries caused by the negligence of its
servants or agents, although the injured party paid for its service.
Saffron v. Y.M.C.A. of Chicago, 45 N.E. (2d) 555 (Ill. App. 1942).
Generally a charitable corporation has been defined by the courts
as one operated primarily for the benefit of the public rather than for
private gain, but which is not a direct agent of the government. The
fact that the institution receives payment for its services from its bene-
ficiaries does not affect its charitable character so long as the fees are
for the purpose of enabling it to carry out its charitable purposes and
are not for private profit.
A number of the states seem to hold charitable corporations liable
almost as though they were operating for private profit, and the ques-
tion of tort-liability is no different than in the case of any other corpo-
ration. However the great weight of authority cannot be said to favor
such a rule and in many of the states a charitable corporation enjoys
an immunity as to wrongs as to certain classes of persons that a cor-
poration generally does not possess. The conflict among the various
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states is due largely to the variety of theories upon which the decisions
are based.
Many of the courts have based their opinions upon the so-called
doctrine of public policy, giving as their reason that such institutions
are inspired and supported by benevolence, and devote their assets and
energies to the relief for which the corporation was created; and that
common welfare demands that they be encouraged and held exempt
from liability for tort; that to do otherwise would result in discourag-
ing those inclined to contribute to charities and a~ply the funds
especially contributed for a public charitable purpose to objects not
contemplated by the donors, namely, to damage suits. In Vermillion v.
Womens' College of Due West, 10 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649 (1916), it
was said that the state is most deeply interested in the preservation of
public charities, and the questions of public policy must be determined
upon the consideration of what on the whole will best promote the
general welfare. Substantially similar was the ruling in Fordyce v.
Womens' Christian Library Asociation, 79 Ark. 550, 96 S.W. 155
(1906).
This public policy theory has been disapproved in a number of cases.
In Bruce v. Central Methodist Episcopal Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110
N.W. 951 (1907), the defendant church was held liable for injuries
to an employee of a contractor under a contract for decorating its
church building, the injury having been caused by the negligence of
the agents of the defendants in furnishing a defective scaffolding.
Closely connected with the public policy theory is the doctrine of a
trust fund upon which many of the earlier cases based their decisions.
Under the doctrine it was determined that a charity fund could not be
used to compensate injured persons because such compensation would
tend to divert the fund to purposes not intended by the donors, and
because it would frustrate the purposes of the creators of the fund.
Generally this doctrine has been repiudiated in the United States; it is
said in 13 Ruling Case Law, p. 945, Sec. 9:
"In answer to this argument, however, it has been said that
while the public has an interest in the maintenance of a great
public charity, it also has an interest in obliging every person and
corporation which undertakes the performance of a duty to
perform it carefully, and to that extent, therefore, it has an
interest against exempting any person and any such corporation
from liability for its negligence, and that moreover, it is solely
for the legislature, and not for the courts, to say that the former
interest is so supreme that the latter must be sacrificed to it."
In the case of Downes v. Harper Hospital, 110 Mich. 555, 60 N.W.
42 (1894), it was held that a corporation organized and maintained
for no private gain, but for the purpose of care and medical treatment
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of the sick and to that end to manage a trust fund created for that pur-
pose, cannot be made liable for injuries sustained by a patient by rea-
son of the negligent acts of its managers and employees. Here the
decision was based upon an implied contract with the person injured
that he would assume the risk of such torts as may be committed by
the charitable institution whose benefits he was receiving. Both in the
Bruce case supra, and in Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R.I. 22, 85 Atl.
120 (1912), the plaintiff was not a beneficiary of the trust administered
by the defendant, but was an employee of the defendant's contractor or
of the defendant itself.
Also charitable corporations have been held liable for injuries to
their employees, since they are not the recipients of the benefits of the
charity. Hughes v. President and Directors of Georgetown College,
33 F. Supp. 867 (D.C. D.C., 1940).
The administrator of the estate of a beneficiary of a charitable
institution, organized solely for public benefit, recovered damages for
the negligence of a nurse when a patient, in a delirium, jumped from
a second story window and was killed. The court based its decision on
the theory that immunity to the charitable institution for the tort of its
servant would compel the person injured to contribute the amount of
his loss to the charity against his will, and that this could not be
regarded as socially desirable nor consistent with sound policy, espe-
cially in view of the hardship which would result to the widow and
children in such a case. Mulliner v. Evangelischer Kiakenneissenverein
of Minn. Dist. of German Evangelical Synod of North America, 144
Minn. 392, 175 N.W. 699 (1920).
In Daniels v. Rahway Hospital, 10 N.J. Misc. 585, 160 Atl. 644
(1932), the plaintiff, in driving his automobile upon a public highway,
was a complete stranger to the charity. He was involved in a collision
with the driver of the defendant's ambulance and the defendant's agent
was found to have been negligent. The court, in awarding damages,
felt that no one, no matter how elevated his motive or how humane his
purpose should be permitted to set up and operate the machinery of his
charitable organization with impunity to injure by negligence those
unconcerned in and unrelated to that which the donor brought into
being.
The doctrine perhaps most generally recognized by the courts is the
implied-waiver doctrine, that is, waiver by acceptance of benefits; this
doctrine applies only to the beneficiaries of charitable institutions. In
the case of Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 160 N.W. 173 (1917),
the Wisconsin court based its decision upon the doctrine that a hospital
performs a quasi-governmental function, and for that reason the doc-
trine or respondeat superior does not apply. The court in deciding the
case of Bachman v. Y.W.C.A., 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W. 751 (1922),
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followed the Morrison case, supra, and was of the opinion that because
of the purposes, nature, and functions of the Y.W.C.A., master and
employer of the negligent employee, the liability for the accident must
rest on the negligent individual where it primarily belongs. In effect,
the Wisconsin cases hold that the doctrine of immunity of a public
charitable institution from liability to a beneficiary within its walls
from the negligent acts of its servants, under the principle of re-
spondeat superior, is applicable as well to one who is a stranger not
receiving the services or benefits from the institution. In its firm hold-
ing to immunity, the Wisconsin court goes so far as to exempt the
charitable institution from liability even in the negligent selection of
its employees. In the case of Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess
Society of Wisconsin, 218 Wis. 169, 260 N.W. 476 (1935), the court
reasoned that since a charitable hospital is exempt from liability for the
negligent acts of its employees committed upon its patients, it should
also be exempt from liability for negligence of its managing officers in
selecting such incompetent employees. Some courts have held that
although the liability of the charity for all torts of its agents cannot
be upheld, it is liable if there is negligence in the selection of such
agents and employees. This is directly in conflict with the Schumacher
case supra. In that case the court said,
"Precisely the same reason lies for the exemption in both
cases, and it lies precisely to the same extent."
It would appear therefore that in Wisconsin there is immunity of
charitable institutions under all circumstances. However, there is an
exception where the charitable institution has failed to comply with
the statute requiring the maintenance of a safe public building for
employees and frequenters. Sec. 101.01, 101.06, Wis. Stat. (1941). The
above statutes were held to be applicable to religious corporations
regulating liability to one attending a church luncheon who was injured
on an unlighted stairway. Wilson v. Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Reformation of Milwaukee, 202 Wis. 111, 230 N.W. 708 (1930).
The state of Minnesota having a similar statute, sustained the liability
of the charitable association for injury caused by contact with machin-
ery not guarded as required by statute.. Mclverny v. St. Luke's Hospital
Association, 122 Minn. 10, 141 N.W. 837 (1913).
RAzy G. KLErEcKA.
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